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ADMINISTRATIVE DELAY AND 
JUDICIAL RELIEF 
Steven Goldman* 
For who would bear the whips and scorns of time, 
The oppressor's wrong ... the law's delay. 
Hamlet, Act III, s. I 
I. THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION 
ADMINISTRATIVE agencies, created in part to provide simple, speedy, and efficient procedures, have often been prone to 
excessive delay in their proceedings.1 Lapses of time in administra-
tive proceedings may occasion considerable individual and social 
costs. Increased expenses may be a direct consequence of the delay, 
as are lawyers' fees and executives' time, or may result indirectly 
from factors such as the rising cost of necessary goods and services 
during an inflationary period. In addition, lengthy administrative 
proceedings may force abandonment of profitable projects or may 
create such uncertainty as to the outcome of the proceedings that 
the party's ability to plan is hampered and his credit position im-
paired. If the regulated party is a public corporation, even the mar-
ket price of its stock may be affected by delay. The prospect of delay 
may discourage desirable activity by stifling individual initiative or 
may induce avoidance of the administrative process, thereby under-
mining its very raison d'etre. Finally, all of these difficulties are 
compounded in the case of a small business that is unable to bear 
the risk and uncertainty incident to delay.2 
In many instances, however, the passage of time is a requisite to 
the effective functioning of the administrative process. Time may be 
necessary to build an adequate record, to pursue informal negotia-
tions, to reach settlements in other related cases, or to insure the 
parties a full and careful consideration of all the relevant issues. 
• Assistant Professor of Business Law, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, 
University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1964, Princeton University; LL.B. 1967, Harvard 
University.-Ed. 
1. See H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 68 (1967): 
I wonder whether law students still are taught, as we were in the 1920's, to con-
trast the celerity of those Mercury-like and wing-footed messengers, the admin-
istrative agencies, with the creeping and cumbersome processes of the courts. If 
they are, they have a rude awakening ahead, on both counts. To borrow Mr. 
Churchill's phrase, the regulatory agencies often tolerate delays up with which 
the judiciary would not put. 
2. See Long, Administrative Proceedings: Their Time and Cost Can Be Cut Down, 
49 A.B.A.J. 833 (1963); Note, Judicial Acceleration of the Administrative Process: The 
Right to Relief From Unduly Protracted Proceedings, 72 YALE L.J. 574 (1963). 
[ 1423] 
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On the other hand, delay is frequently unrelated to the proper func-
tioning of the administrative process. Causes for such delay include 
crowded dockets, inadequate appropriations, lack of personnel, 
indecision on major policies, tactical delays by opposing parties, and 
unnecessary or repetitious procedures and hearings. 
When parties suffer substantial harm from unwarranted admin-
istrative delay, they quite naturally turn to the courts for relief; 
indeed, disinterested judicial scrutiny of administrative Ia-wmaking 
is a useful and recognized component of our legal system. The func-
tion of the courts as second-line reviewing agencies is not logically 
limited to reviewing administrative action as distinct from adminis-
trative inaction. The courts and administrative agencies share a con-
cern for fashioning a legal system which is effective and responsive 
to individual demands for an orderly and expeditious resolution of 
issues. And, from the viewpoint of the private parties, the advan-
tages of another potential avenue of relief are manifest: agencies 
seldom have internal review boards for expediting action, and in-
formal relief through political pressure-while available to econom-
ically or politically powerful groups-is not ·within the rea~h of the 
average private party. Thus, judicial review of administrative delay 
may open an alternative channel of relief to all parties, irrespective 
of wealth and power. 
The problem of judicial relief from protracted agency delay has 
been virtually undiscussed in the existing literature. The few courts 
that have dealt with the delay question have acted instinctively, 
without providing any rational framework and without articulating 
either relevant concerns or appropriate standards. This Article will 
explore the range of issues raised when courts are called upon to 
grant relief from excessive administrative delay. 
II. EFFECTIVE LIMITS oF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION: Is ADMINISTRATIVE 
DELAY JUSTICIABLE? 
Although the above considerations may favor judicial interven-
tion, considerations of judicial competence may limit the ability of 
courts to resolve questions of administrative delay. A court may be 
unable to obtain all of the information necessary for a reasoned 
judgment, to evolve meaningful standards that will guide future 
administrative conduct, or even to fashion an appropriate remedy. 
In short, the question of administrative delay may be a "managerial" 
question not soluble by generally applicable criteria of decision and 
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therefore more suitable for legislative or administrative control than 
for judicial supervision. The justiciability of the delay issue in vary-
ing contexts may be illustrated by several hypothetical cases. 
Case I: Evenhandedness 
In 1963, Pipeline Inc., a newly organized corporation, applied 
for a commission certificate to construct and operate a pipeline. 
The normal time necessary for the agency to dispose of pipeline 
certification cases is three years. Five years have passed, and Pipeline 
institutes suit in an appropriate court alleging that there is no sub-
stantial reason why its application should take longer than other 
routine certification cases. Pipeline requests the court to compel the 
agency either to expedite the proceedings or to show cause why a 
certificate should not be issued. 
The delay issue in this case seems to be justiciable. Since there is 
proof of the normal time necessary to dispose of similar proceed-
ings, the court has a ready-made standard for judgment. Assuming 
that Pipeline is able to show that it is within the class that normally 
receives certification in three years, the policy of evenhandedness-
the notion that like cases should be treated alike-provides the 
court with a familar and judicially manageable criterion for mak-
ing a reasoned decision.3 Presumably, the court also would be able 
to evaluate asserted administrative justifications for treating Pipe-
line differently. Moreover, unlike case III, discussed below, fashion-
ing an appropriate remedy would not involve elaborate and time-
consuming proof of comparative harm to other applicants similarly 
situated. If Pipeline is one of a very few applicants suffering from 
five years' delay, the court might easily expedite its case without un-
due prejudice to other pending applications. But, if Pipeline is only 
one of a large group of companies whose applications have been 
pending for five years, the court might conclude that the time re-
quired for disposal of similar cases is not really three years but five. 
Thus, the question of the propriety of judicial intervention may 
well tum upon whether there has been excessive delay at all-an is-
sue which a court is clearly competent to decide. 
Case II: Bias 
The same facts as in case I, but Pipeline alleges that its applica-
tion has been pending for two years longer than the average be-
ll. See, e.g., International Business Mach. Co. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 
1965). 
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cause a commissioner has a personal grudge against the president of 
Pipeline and has deliberately caused delay to force Pipeline out of 
business. 
The delay issue in this case is equally appropriate for adjudica-
tion. The standards employed in case I are available to guide 
judicial judgment. And, the additional factor of bias provides the 
court with a further ground for assessing whether the delay is un-
reasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. Courts have carefully scruti-
nized administrative action tainted with bias or prejudice, and 
there seems to be no sound reason to distinguish those cases from an 
instance in which bias causes agency inaction. Even if there were 
legitimate reasons for denying Pipeline's application, there still 
would be little justification for the commission to delay decision; 
rather, the agency should issue a timely, outright denial, which 
would be subject to disinterested judicial review. Finally, as in case 
I, the appropriate remedy seems relatively easy to fashion. 
Case III: Political Impotence 
The same facts as in case I, but Pipeline claims that its applica-
tion has been pending for five years because Major Inc., a giant in 
the oil industry, has exerted its political and economic influence by 
pressuring congressmen to expedite consideration of its own appli-
cation. 
Delay resulting from the political strength of other regulated 
parties is a more troublesome issue for adjudication than is the delay 
in either case I or II. On the one hand, the policy of evenhanded-
ness provides the court with some standard for judgment. And 
yet, perhaps a court should not attempt to redress the imbalance of 
economic and political power where no otherwise improper con-
duct has been shown. It is well recognized that the administrative 
process is not insulated from political forces, and it is at best doubt-
ful whether a court can say that governmental regulation should be 
responsive to some legitimate political forces but not to others. 
Moreover, fashioning an appropriate remedy would be difficult in 
this situation. Any equitable considerations that favor accelerating 
Pipeline's application could also be urged on behalf of other appli-
cants who have been forced to wait their turns while Major re-
ceived preferred treatment. Thus, judicial relief for Pipeline alone 
might be unfair to these other applicants, unless it can be proved 
that Pipeline's case is different or that delay is more burdensome to 
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Pipeline. Proof of these factors would vastly expand the scope of 
judicial inquiry into issues more appropriate for resolution by the 
agency docket clerk than by a court. Furthermore, the weighing of 
relative harm suffered by various applicants might be not only ju-
dicially infeasible, but also seriously burdensome to the courts. The 
court could avoid some of these difficulties by enjoining the agency 
from expediting Major's case if it is not too late to do so. In effect, 
Pipeline would be viewed as bringing a class action on behalf of all 
similarly injured parties; but such an approach would still be open 
to the objection that the court is interfering with the normal func-
tioning of the political process and meddling in agency business. 
Case IV: Agency Priority 
The same facts as in case I, but Pipeline argues that its applica-
tion has been pending for five years because the agency has deter-
mined that Major's application deserves priority over other appli-
cants due to the importance of its proposed facilities. 
As in the preceding case, Pipeline has been harmed not as a 
single entity, but as a member of a class of applicants, all of whom 
have been pushed back one place in line. Even if this procedural 
objection could be obviated through the use of a class action, relief 
exclusively for Pipeline would be unfair to similarly situated parties 
and it seems doubtful that a court would be competent to resolve 
the "managerial" problem of allocating priorities to limited agency 
resources.4 It is even more doubtful that the court could make a 
more informed decision than agency experts on the question of 
whether the social benefits of accelerating Major's application out-
weigh the detriments. Nevertheless, the court appears competent to 
exercise its normal limited review over agency action: to evaluate 
the legal sufficiency of the commission's reasons and determine 
whether the agency considered the proper factors in arriving at its 
judgment. Therefore, if the issue was presented in timely proceed-
ings and the court found that Major's application was advanced for 
inadequate or unjustifiable reasons or without full consideration of 
the relevant factors, it might remand to the agency for additional 
findings or enjoin acceleration of Major's case. 
4. Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 156 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring): "Whether 'justiciability' exists ..• has most often 
turned on evaluating both the appropriateness of issues for decision by courts and the 
hardship of denying relief." See also note 58 infra. 
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Case V: Judicial Priority 
In 1967, Major Inc., the oil industry giant, applied for a certifi-
cate to construct and operate a pipeline. The normal time neces-
sary to dispose of pipeline certification cases is three years. One and 
one-half years has elapsed, and Major institutes suit seeking judicial 
acceleration of its application on the ground that its proposed fa-
cilities are important to the community and that it will have to 
forgo the project entirely unless approval is forthcoming. 
Despite the fact that Major might be able to achieve its ob-
jective through the political process5 or by agency action,0 judicial 
relief seems inappropriate in this context. Apart from the question 
of whether the legislature intended the courts to intervene affirma-
tively in the administrative process, there are no meaningful stan-
dards which a court can use to determine whether Major's request 
for priority is warranted. Even if the court were to decide that the 
appropriate standard is "public interest," a comprehensive, com-
parative analysis of other matters pending on the commission's 
docket would be required to determine if other applications were 
of greater "public interest" or if the detriment to the public caused 
by deferring other cases ounveighs the benefit from deciding Ma-
jor's case immediately. Such a comparative determination would be 
time consuming and would require judicial balancing of largely im-
measurable factors. Moreover, even if courts were capable of bal-
ancing these factors, they lack the equipment for gathering the in-
formation needed to assess these complex economic issues. And, 
more important, because of the numerous variables to be consid-
ered in determining priority benveen applicants, ad hoc administra-
tive discretion seems more appropriate than judicial "reasoned 
elaboration" since it is largely impossible to develop "generally ap-
plicable premises of reasoning with reference to which the variables 
can be judged."7 
Other factors lead to the conclusion that the priority question 
should not be justiciable in this context. Many applicants, as a mat-
ter of course, could apply to various courts for expediting orders. 
Conceivably, an administrative agency would be subjected to many 
conflicting court orders, resulting in a significant loss of agency con-
trol over the scheduling of its own docket, and making it impossible 
5. Cf. Case III supra. 
6. Cf. Case IV supra. 
7. H. Hart &: A. Saks, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW 669 (1968). 
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for the agency to comply with possibly inconsistent orders. If the 
courts were required to consider other court orders establishing 
priorities, there would be an unwarranted premium placed on the 
diligence of applicants who rush to the courthouse first. This prob-
lem could probably be avoided by vesting exclusive jurisdiction over 
priority cases in one court; but even if such an approach were 
politically feasible, it seems doubtful that a special court would be 
any better equipped to resolve the essentially "managerial" problems 
inherent in supervision of an agency docket. 
Case VI: Efficiency 
The same facts as in case I, except that after one and one-half 
years Pipeline institutes suit alleging that its case should be decided 
immediately because there is no reason for certification proceedings 
to take three years, and that if the agency were more efficient, certi-
fication decisions could be rendered in one and one-half years. 
Unlike case V, where the applicant seeks priority over other 
parties by asserting an affirmative justification, the court in this case 
would not be required to undertake the difficult analysis of the com-
peting claims of other applicants. Instead, since Pipeline's claim per-
tains to the efficient allocation of administrative resources as a whole, 
the court must decide whether the commission is acting with appro-
priate dispatch in all of its certification cases. In most cases a court 
would not be competent to make such a decision. While it might be 
argued that a workable test could be based upon the normal time 
required by this agency or other agencies to process similar cases, it 
is unlikely that a court could evolve viable standards to determine 
the appropriate length of time for any particular administrative 
action. The court would have to work with a relative standard such 
as "reasonable dispatch" rather than making an essentially legislative 
judgment that a particular administrative practice should take no 
longer than a specified period of time. However, a "reasonable dis-
patch" standard is not likely to be susceptible to reasoned elabora-
tion: the large number of potentially relevant £actors and the dif-
ficulty of assessing the relative importance of each variable seem to 
preclude effective adjudication. For example, to determine whether 
three years constitutes "reasonable dispatch" for pipeline certifica-
tion proceedings, it may be necessary to examine the nature of the 
proceedings required by statute, the complexity of the substantive 
issues, the relative importance of pipeline certification matters to 
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other kinds of pending cases, the amount and quality of agency re-
sources, and so forth. These factors are largely immeasurable, and 
their relative importance varies considerably over time because of 
the dynamic nature of the administrative process. Moreover, some 
of these factors-such as the relative importance of different types 
of agency actions-require an initial policy determination that is 
clearly nonjudicial in nature. Finally, the stare decisis effect of such 
a decision would be minimal. Considerable relitigation of the same 
issue under changing circumstances would be likely; and, as a matter 
of policy, there is serious question whether limited judicial re-
sources should be allocated to making such ephemeral decisions. 
The difficulty of acquiring enough evidence to formulate a rea-
soned judgment also leads to the conclusion that the delay issue is 
not justiciable when it turns on questions of administrative effi-
ciency. Since independent judicial research is generally impractical, 
the court would be forced to rely upon those few factors which may 
be considered by judicial notice and on evidence gathered by the 
parties to the proceeding. To be sure, most of the relevant informa-
tion would be in the hands of the agency. However, a rule of evi-
dence requiring the agency to come fonvard with all the informa-
tion justifying the length of its proceedings still would not suffice to 
provide the court with information about dilatory behavior or ad-
ministrative inefficiency. And, it is certainly not clear that the court 
could require an agency to come forward with evidence proving 
the applicant's case as well. Perhaps discovery procedures would 
provide the applicant and the court with the relevant facts relating 
to administrative inefficiency. However, discovery would seem to be 
an inadequate tool unless the agency had compiled the relevant rec-
ords and comparative time charts.8 Finally, the courts' ability to 
fashion an appropriate remedy is also open to serious question 
when administrative delay is caused by inefficiency. If delay results 
from inadequate appropriations, lack of personnel, or incompe-
tence, the remedy seems to lie with the legislature and not with the 
courts. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, however, some challenges to 
administrative inefficiency should be justiciable. For example, if an 
agency holds repetitive hearings, the delay issue is susceptible of ad-
8. Even though many courts possess broad discovery powers, the time and expense 
burden of searching an agency's records could still defeat the plaintiff's case. More-
.over, there appears to be inherent danger in opening agency files when competitors 
in the same industry have cases pending before the agency. 
May 1968] Administrative Delay 1431 
judication. The standard of "reasonable dispatch" is judicially 
manageable in this context: the court can determine whether the 
asserted benefits derived from additional hearings outweigh the po-
tential harm that the delay would inflict upon the party before the 
agency. In this situation the court is not faced with a difficult in-
quiry into how agency resources should be allocated among com-
peting activities; instead, agency resources may be freed from use-
less activity and put to more productive use. Furthermore, the 
information needed to weigh the asserted benefits and detriments 
would be readily accessible in the record of the agency proceedings, 
the asserted administrative justification for additional hearings, and 
the complaint alleging the harm suffered by the party before the 
agency. Finally, a court would be able to grant an appropriate rem-
edy by enjoining the repetitious proceedings. 
As the foregoing hypotheticals indicate, most cases fall between 
the polar extremes of complaints about useless hearings and general 
allegations of administrative inefficiency. In each such instance, the 
institutional competence of the court to adjudicate the delay issue 
depends upon a range of considerations including the nature and 
cause of the delay, the existence of ascertainable and judicially man-
ageable standards, the availability of information needed to decide 
the case, and the possibility of fashioning an effective remedy. If an 
analysis based upon these considerations leads to the conclusion that 
a given case is within the court's sphere of competence, the prospec-
tive plaintiff must then construct an appropriate theory of relief. 
III. EQUITABLE RELIEF: PREREQUISITES AND THEORIES 
A. Prerequisites for Relief 
When a party suffers from agency delay, the cases indicate that 
he will probably seek some form of equitable relief.9 If a court is 
to grant an injunction against agency delay, according to traditional 
theory, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he has no adequate legal 
remedy and that he is suffering irreparable harm10 because of the de-
lay. An example of such a showing is American Broadcasting Co. v. 
9. A writ of mandamus, though technically a legal remedy [Stern v. South Chester 
Tube Co., 390 U.S. 606 (1968) (dictum)], is "largely controlled by equitable principles." 
Duncan Townsite Co. v. Lane, 245 U.S. 308, 311 (1917). The federal district courts are 
empowered to issue writs "in the nature of mandamus" against "an officer or employee 
of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff," 
28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964), although the writ itself no longer exists as a "writ of man-
damus." FED. R. CIV. P. 8l(b). 
10. See pages 1450-52 infra. 
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Federal Communications Commission,11 where the American Broad-
casting Company (ABC) successfully contended that agency inaction 
had nullified substantially its rights under the Federal Communica-
tions Act. The controversy first arose in 1941, when the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) temporarily assigned radio sta-
tion KOB to a frequency of 770 cycles. WJZ, which operated on 
that frequency, protested, but the war intervened and WJZ did not 
press its objections. However, in 1944 KOB requested a permanent 
license for 770 cycles, and WJZ's motion requesting dismissal of the 
KOB application was denied. In August 1946 the FCC announced 
that it would not evaluate clear channel applications until the com-
pletion of a clear channel investigation then being conducted by the 
agency, and that it would extend KOB's special service authoriza-
tion to maintain the status quo pending the outcome of the clear 
channel proceedings. Ten years after the first temporary, six-month 
license was issued, and after successive issuances of similar six-month 
licenses, both KOB and WJZ appealed from a further extension of 
KOB's special service authorization on the ground that these suc-
cessive renewals had changed a temporary order into a permanent 
one. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held 
that since there was no showing that the clear channel investigation 
would be completed in the near future, the FCC could not maintain 
the status quo indefinitely by arguing that the ultimate determina-
tion of KOB's status depended upon the outcome of the investiga-
tion: 
WJZ has thus been required to bear a large part of the loss . . . . 
The Commission has in effect permitted this substantial loss to 
occur and to continue. 
. . . [C]ourts must act to make certain that what can be done is 
done. Agency inaction can be as harmful as wrong action. The Com-
mission cannot, by its delay, substantially nullify rights which the 
Act confers ... . 
We cannot ... determine the ultimate disposition ... of the 
. . . controversy . . . . But we can provide "a remedy against in-
action" .... 
. . . If appropriate proceedings are promptly begun and expedi-
tiously carried forward ... the Commission ... [may] preserve the 
status quo for such reasonable period as may be necessary to make 
"a valid determination * * * with all deliberate speed."12 
The delay causing irreparable harm to the party before the 
agency may take several forms. For example, in Application of Trico 
11. 191 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
12. 191 F.2d at 501-02. 
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Electric Cooperative, Inc.13 the Arizona supreme court held that 
the serious financial loss that Trico was suffering because of delay 
was sufficient ground for compelling the state corporation commis-
sion either to approve a contract or to show cause why it would not 
assent. Irreparable harm may also result from administrative delay 
in failing to proceed against other similarly situated parties. In 
C. E. Niehoff & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,14 the agency pro-
ceeded against only one of nineteen competitors, all of whom al-
legedly engaged in the same illegal pricing practices. It appeared 
that if only Niehoff was enjoined, it would be forced out of busi-
ness. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit suspended 
enforcement against Niehoff until similar orders were entered 
against Niehoff's competitors in order to achieve equal treatment of 
like-situated parties. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed, 
however, holding that the timing of orders was "peculiarly within 
the expert understanding of the Commission."15 Unequal timing of 
related orders may be another cause of irreparable harm. In Atlantic 
Seaboard Corp. v. Federal Power Commission,16 the agency sus-
pended rate increases of Atlantic Seaboard, its supplier, and its sup-
plier's supplier for a period of six months. However, Atlantic Sea-
board's six-month suspension period began and ended twenty-two 
days later than that of its supplier. As a result, Atlantic Seaboard 
would have had to pay substantially higher prices to its supplier for 
twenty-two days before its own rates could have been increased. The 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in effect eliminated this tim-
ing problem by making· the six-month suspension period for all par-
ties coincide. 
Other policies, however, might outweigh a party's showing of 
irreparable harm and result in denial of relief from protracted agency 
delay. For example, in Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission,11 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit set aside 
a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) cease and desist order on the 
grounds that the order was not supported by substantial evidence and 
that one member of the FTC was disqualified from participating in 
the case. The court concluded that the normal procedure of remand 
was inappropriate because of inordinate delays throughout the litiga-
tion, and ordered the complaint dismissed. This order was vacated 
13. 92 Ariz. 373, 377 P .2d 309 (1962). 
14. 241 F.2d 37, 41-43 (7th Cir. 1957), rev'd sub. nom. Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 
355 U.S. 411, 413 (1958). 
15. Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413 (1958). 
16. 201 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1953). 
17. 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964), rev'd, 381 U.S. 739 (1965). 
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by the Supreme Court and the case was remanded to the FTC for 
further action. The Court concluded that the proceedings against 
Texaco ought not to be terminated, because to do so would subordi-
nate the public interest in effective competition to Texaco's interest 
in speedy adjudication.18 
B. Theories of Relief 
I. Constitutional Arguments 
Judical relief from protracted administrative delay was first given 
during the period when federal courts exercised close constitutional 
supervision over the rate-making decisions of public utility commis-
sions. In one of the few cases dealing with agency delay, Smith 
v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,19 Illinois Bell successfully argued that 
a state commerce commission's delay unconstitutionally deprived it 
of property without due process of law. In July of 1919 Illinois 
Bell filed a schedule of rates that were to become effective on May 1, 
1920. The commission repeatedly suspended the effective date of the 
rate increase, and in the latter part of 1921 it entered an order per-
manently suspending the rate increase. In April 1922, a state court 
reversed the commission order and remanded the case for further 
hearings. The commission held new hearings, but made no final de-
termination. Illinois Bell then filed a motion requesting that the 
commission approve a temporary schedule of rates pending its final 
determination. This motion was ignored. Finally, in June of 1924, 
Illinois Bell successfully requested a federal court to enjoin the 
commission from enforcing the original schedule of rates, which it 
alleged to be confiscatory. In affirming the grant of the injunction 
the Supreme Court stated: 
Property may be as effectively taken by long-continued and un-
reasonable delay in putting an end to confiscatory rates as by an 
express affirmance of them .... [T]he injured public service company 
is not required indefinitely to await a decision of the rate-making 
tribunal before applying to a federal court for equitable relief.20 
When the confiscatory results of the delay are not as readily ap-
parent as they were in the rate regulation cases, however, constitu-
tional objections to administrative delay generally have been unsuc-
18. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 381 U.S. 739 (1965). 
19. 270 U.S. 587 (1926); see also Banton v. Belt Line Ry. Corp., 268 U.S. 413 (1925); 
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 (1923); Prendergast v. New York 
Tel. Co., 262 U.S. 43 (1923). 
20. 270 U.S. at 591-92. 
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cessful. For example, in Berkshire Employees Ass'n of Berkshire 
Knitting Mills v. NLRB21 the employer requested that a National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) order be set aside on the ground 
that the NLRB's delay in issuing a complaint constituted a denial 
of due process. The evidence indicated that the issuance of the com-
plaint had been postponed at the request of union officials in order 
to further their strategy at the bargaining table. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit held that agency delay in filing the com-
plaint did not constitute a denial of due process: 
The matter of time ·with regard to the issuance of a complaint by an 
administrative body must necessarily be one of the matters within 
the discretion of that body. Numerous considerations may make 
it desirable that a complaint be issued promptly or be delayed, 
for example, pending a court decision, or the likelihood of settle-
ment of a dispute by other means; these and others are matters in 
which the judgment of the administrative agency must be exercised. 
w·e do not find lack of due process of law in the fact of delay .... 22 
Although an agency has broad discretion in controlling its pro-
cedures, it seems clear that the Constitution provides some limita-
tions on protracted administrative delay. The Illinois Bell case indi-
cates the limitation imposed by the due process clause on dilatory 
behavior, and arbitrary or capricious administrative behavior may 
also raise equal protection questions, as, for example, where an 
agency systematically discriminates against Negro applicants by de-
liberately employing dilatory tactics against them. Such discrimina-
tory behavior could certainly be condemned as a denial of equal 
protection if the administrative body in question were a state agency. 
And, even though the equal protection clause does not by its terms 
apply to the federal government, overt racial discrimination by a 
federal agency would probably violate concepts of fairness inherent 
in the due process clause of the fifth amendment.23 The harder case, 
21. 121 F.2d 235 (3d Cir. 1941). 
22. 121 F.2d at 237. 
23. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) [footnote omitted]: 
The Fifth Amendment ••• does not contain an equal protection clause as does 
the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of 
equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of 
fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The "equal protection of the laws" is a more 
explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process of law," and, there-
fore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as 
this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be viola-
tive of due process. 
See also Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 
548, 584-85 (1937); Antieau, Equal Protection Outside the Clause, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 
362 (1952). 
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however, is like case I, above, in which there is no affirmative evi-
dence of discrimination other than the fact that similar proceedings 
are normally disposed of within a much shorter period of time. 
There is certainly a prima facie violation of the policy of even-
handedness. Assuming that the agency cannot iustify the delay, it 
seems that the spirit of the equal protection clause has been frus-
trated by such differential treatment. However, it could be argued 
that the court should avoid the constitutional issue by relying on 
some other theory of relief.24 
An analog-ous use of specific constitutional provisions to control 
delay can be found in several recent cases. In the free speech area, 
for example, prior restraint of motion pictures is permissible only 
if the censoring body either issues a license or seeks judicial prohibi-
tion within a "specified brief period" of time. 25 Similarly, the seizure 
of allegedly obscene books may be invalidated if governmental delay 
has suppressed the books for an unduly protracted period.26 
First amendment concerns for "chilling" free speech were com-
bined with the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial to strike 
down dilatory governmental proceedings in Klobfer v. North Caro-
lina.21 The delay in this case resulted from North Carolina's statutory 
nolle prosequi procedure which allowed the state to hold Kloofer-
over his objection-subject to trial for an unlimited period. During 
this time, the solicitor could restore the case to the calendar, but 
Klopfer could neither obtain a dismissal nor have the case restored 
to the calendar for trial. Klopfer had been indicted for criminal tres-
pass following a civil rights demonstration in February 1964, and 
prosecution be~n in March 1964. When the jury failed to reach a 
verdict, the judge declared a mistrial and ordered the case continued 
24. See Tustice Brandeis' famous concurring opinion in Ashwander v. TV A, 297 
U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936), for an extensive discussion of the Court's practice of avoiding 
constitutional issues. 
25. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965). See also Teitel Film Corp. v. 
Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968). 
26. United States v. One Book Entitled "The Adventures of Father Silas," 249 F. 
Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Cf. United States v. Reliable Sales Co., 376 F.2d 803, 805 
(4th Cir. 1967), in which the court held that during the government's appeal only a 
small proportion of allegedly obscene books could be retained in custody in order to 
prevent the case from becoming moot: 
fWlhile the cases deal principally with administrative <lelav which invalidates 
prior submission processes of censorship, the Court in Freedman specified the 
safeguards necessary to make the process constitutional as follows: (I) the burden 
of proof must rest on the censor; (2) no valid final restraint may be imposed ex-
cept bv judicial determination, and any restraint prior to such determination must 
be designed to preserve the status quo; and (3) a prompt judicial determination 
must be assured. [Emphasis in original]. 
Zl. 386 U.S. 213 (1967). 
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for the term. Before the April 1965 term, the solicitor prevailed on a 
motion to continue the case for another term. When Klopfer's case 
was not listed for trial in the August 1965 term, he filed a motion ex-
pressing his desire to have the case pending against him concluded 
"as soon as reasonably possible" because the pending indictment 
interfered with his activities as a private citizen. The solicitor moved 
successfully for a nolle prosequi with leave, which allowed him to 
restore the case to trial at any future date. The Supreme Court, hold-
ing that this procedure denied Klopfer his right to a speedy trial, 
stated: 
The pendency of the indictment may subject him to public scorn and 
deprive him of employment, and almost certainly will force cur-
tailment of his speech, associations and participation in unpopular 
causes. By indefinitely prolonging this oppression, as well as the 
"anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation," the criminal 
procedure ... denies the petitioner the right to a speedy trial .... 28 
Although the sixth amendment confines the right to a speedy 
trial exclusively to criminal prosecutions, it is not inconceivable that 
this right might extend to administrative proceedings which require 
a subsequent criminal prosecution and perhaps even to agency dis-
ciplinary hearings of a quasi-criminal nature. In instances where 
the agency must institute criminal proceedings for a willful violation 
of its rules, it is arguable that undue delay in seeking a court deter-
mination of guilt or innocence deprives the party before the agency 
of his right to a speedy trial. Although there is no indictment against 
such a party, the pending agency proceedings may subject the party 
to public scorn and have a "chilling effect" on his associational 
rights. And, if there is no statute of limitations prescribing the time 
within which the agency must come to court, the party before the 
agency would be subject to trial for an unlimited period during which 
he would have no means of securing a dismissal or of obtaining an 
adjudication on the merits. Such a situation might well constitute 
an infringement of the right to speedy trial, although a court might 
prefer to apply a nonconstitutional theory of relief such as !aches. On 
the other hand, the foregoing analysis probably would not apply 
if there is an applicable statute of limitations, since the legislature 
has dra-wn a line between timely and tardy institution of suits.29 Yet, 
28. 386 U.S. at 222. 
29. It could be argued that the applicable statute of limitations is not the sole 
criterion for determining what is a "reasonable" period within which to institute suit, 
since a statute of limitations does not address itself to the question of whether or not 
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even if a "timely" suit were instituted, seriously dilatory behavior 
in prosecuting the action might also result in the denial of the party's 
sixth amendment rights. 
When the agency is not required to seek enforcement in court, 
but rather is permitted by statute to impose a penalty itself, it might 
be contended that undue delay in the agency proceedings deprives 
the party before the agency of his right to a speedy trial. Such a 
contention could be based upon the due process clause as well as on 
the sixth amendment. If due process requires a "trial-type hearing,"30 
a speedy trial might be considered an integral part of the hearing 
requirement. It could also be argued, more broadly, that the right 
to speedy proceedings is implicit in the motion of fundamental fair-
ness and orderly justice guaranteed by the due process clause. 
Apart from the due process clause, it might also be contended 
that the speedy trial guarantee applies to quasi-criminal administra-
tive prosecutions. Although the sixth amendment guarantee of a 
speedy trial may be narrowly construed to apply only to orthodox 
"criminal prosecutions,"31 there is no apparent policy reason why it 
should be; quasi-criminal administrative prosecutions may involve 
the same element of public accusation as criminal prosecutions, and 
the party can be harmed just as much by the delay. However, two 
textual arguments seem to compel the conclusion that the speedy 
trial guarantee is not applicable to this class of administrative pro-
ceedings. The language of the sixth amendment-"right to a speedy 
... trial, by an impartial jury"-appears to bind the speedy trial 
guarantee to a proceeding in which there is a right to a jury. Since 
a party before an administrative agency clearly has no right to a 
jury, it would seem that the sixth amendment guarantee does not 
extend to quasi-criminal administrative proceedings. There is no 
the suit is brought as soon as is reasonably possible. For an example of this kind of 
analysis in the context of a criminal prosecution, see Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 
210 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
30. 'Whether or not due process requires a trial-type hearing is of course a complex 
issue. The requirement varies with the nature of the administrative process applied, 
the kind of issue being determined, and other factors. "Due process" may not include 
all the elements of a common-law trial in particular types of proceedings. Compare 
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) with Bimetallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. 
of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). See generally Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Ins. 
Co., 169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948); First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 
265 (4th Cir. 1965). 
31. See, e.g., Farmers' Livestock Comm'n Co. v. United States, 54 F.2d 375, 378 
(E.D. Ill. 1931) (the withdrawal or suspension of a license, upon an administrative 
finding that a condition imposed in granting the license has not been observed, does 
not constitute a "criminal prosecution"). 
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reason why the right to a speedy trial need be limited exclusively to 
proceedings where there is a right to a jury; yet the plain words of 
the sixth amendment strongly suggest that the guarantee is so 
limited. Moreover, even if the "speedy trial" guarantee were sever-
able from proceedings requiring a jury, the word "trial" undoubt-
edly refers to an orthodox criminal trial. It would clearly expand 
the traditional meaning of the word "trial" to incorporate within it 
administrative prosecutorial proceedings. Finally, as a practical mat-
ter, a court presumabaly would be reluctant to stretch the seemingly 
clear language of the sixth amendment when the due process clause 
might be used to grant the requested relief. 
2. The Administrative Procedure Act 
Another doctrinal basis for obtaining relief from the delay of a 
federal agency may be found in the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).32 Prior to the APA's recent revision,33 section 6(a) provided 
that "every agency shall proceed with reasonable dispatch to conclude 
any manner presented to it .... "34 This section was complemented 
by section IO(e)(A), which directed the reviewing court to "compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed."35 The 
courts, however, appear to have been reluctant to rely upon these 
sections as grounds for remedying agency delay. 
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Donovan,36 in which a steve-
doring company sought to require a deputy commissioner to render 
a decision in a matter properly before him under the Longshoreman's 
Compensation Act, seems to have been the first case to indicate-at 
least in dictum-that both of these provisions of the AP A could be 
enforced by a mandatory injunction: 
The AP A provides categorically that "every agency shall proceed 
with reasonable dispatch to conclude any matter presented to it" .... 
Apparently in recognition that a failure or refusal to hear and decide 
could be as destructive as bad deciding, Congress provided in §IO(e) 
that courts may review the inaction of an agency and specifically 
"compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably de-
layed" ... and enforcement may be by a mandatory injunction.37 
32. 5 u.s.c. §§ 551-59 (1967). 
33. 80 Stat. 393 (1966). 
34. 60 Stat. 240 (1946). 
35. 60 Stat. 243 (1946). 
36. 374 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1960). 
37. 374 F.2d at 802. 
1440 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66:1423 
The first case to hold that the "reasonable dispatch" requirement 
of section 6(a) gives rise to a legally enforceable right was Deering 
Milliken, Inc. v. ]ohnston.38 The case arose out of NLRB hearings 
in 1957 dealing with the charge that Darlington Manufacturing Com-
pany had engaged in an unfair labor practice. At these hearings the 
union sought to introduce evidence to establish that Darlington was 
controlled by Deering Milliken in order to hold Deering responsible 
for Darlington's acts. The trial examiner rejected this evidence as 
being outside the scope of the complaint. When the NLRB reviewed 
the examiner's findings, however, it remanded the case so that evi-
dence could be introduced on the question of control. The hearing 
after remand took ten months. More than a year after this hearing 
was completed, the trial examiner submitted a report to the NLRB 
which rejected the union's claim of single employer status between 
the two companies. In 1961, three years after the first remand order, 
the case again came before the NLRB and was remanded not only 
for a hearing on newly discovered evidence, but also for a rehearing 
of the entire single employer issue. At this point Deering sued to 
enjoin the remand for additional hearings, asserting that the NLRB's 
action constituted unreasonable delay in violation of section 6(a) of 
the AP A. The district court found that the hearings were repetitive 
and granted the injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit accepted this finding and concluded that Deering had a right to 
be free from supplemental hearings which were repetitive, purpose-
less, and oppressive. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit modified the 
injunction to allow further hearings only on the newly discovered 
evidence. 
Other petitioners, however, have been less successful in seeking 
injunctions against remands for additional hearings. In Federal Trade 
Commission v. ]. Weingarten, Inc.,39 Weingarten contended that an 
FTC order to remand to a trial examiner for additional hearings 
after nearly three years of formal proceedings violated the command 
of section 6(a). The district court held that the remand was a vio-
lation of the AP A and ordered the FTC to make a final disposition 
of the matter within thirty days. However, the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit reversed: 
Absent proof of the normal time necessary to dispose of a similar 
proceeding or of facts tending to show a dilatory attitude on the 
part of the Commission or its staff . . . we are unable to say that 
38. 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961). 
39. 336 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1964). 
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a Judge can so hold .... [W]e think it would be the extremely rare 
case where a Court would be justified in holding ... that the pas-
sage of time and nothing more presents an occasion for peremptory 
intervention of an outside Court in the conduct of an agency's ad-
judicative proceedings.40 
Judicial relief has also been withheld when the injured party has 
not first sought acceleration of the action within the agency. This 
requirement is apparently a form of the exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies doctrine. For example, in M. G. Davis & Co. v. 
Cohen,41 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) instituted 
a proceeding to revoke a broker-dealer registration. Two years had 
elapsed since the issuance of the SEC complaint and the SEC had 
done nothing more than appoint a hearing officer to rule on pre-
trial matters. Davis sued for an injunction restraining the SEC from 
continuing its proceedings but the court refused to grant any relief, 
indicating that a complaint for failure to proceed with reasonable 
dispatch must first be made to the agency, regardless of whether the 
delay was justified. The court also observed that the proper remedy 
for unwarranted delay is a court order to expedite the proceeding, 
not a decree terminating it altogether. This judicially imposed re-
quirement of prior demand seems eminently sensible. Such a re-
quirement gives the agency a last opportunity to alleviate the delay. 
Moreover, this practice may facilitate the desirable development of 
internal review boards with authority to rule on the question of 
agency delay. 
The recent revision of the entire APA42 does not appear to alter 
the preceding case law significantly. The "reasonable dispatch" 
language of section 6(a) has been replaced by a "reasonable time" 
standard. Section 555(b) of the current APA provides that "[w]ith 
due regard for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their 
representatives and within a reasonable time, each agency shall pro-
ceed to conclude a matter presented to it."43 It does not seem likely 
that Congress intended to dilute its statutory command by deleting 
"reasonable dispatch" and substituting "reasonable time" as a stan-
dard. The word "dispatch" arguably conveys a tone of haste not 
connoted by the "reasonable time" language. Nevertheless, the lan-
guage of old section IO(e)(A), providing that the reviewing court 
40. 336 F.2d at 691-92. 
41. 256 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); accord, Gearhart &: Otis, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 
798 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
42. See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text. 
43. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1967) (emphasis added). 
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shall "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 
delayed," has been re-enacted verbatim in the new statute.44 Reten-
tion of this language suggests that courts should use the same stan-
dards to review protracted administrative delay under the new AP A 
as they did under the old. Indeed, despite the changed language, the 
legislative history of the new AP A arguably indicates that the courts 
may have a somewhat expanded role in policing protracted adminis-
trative delay. In adopting the new AP A, Congress rejected a pro-
posed alternative draft of the new section 6(a). The proposal, Senate 
Bill 1879, provided: 
Every agency shall proceed with reasonable dispatch to conclude 
any matter presented to it .... Upon application made to any 
Federal Court of competent jurisdiction by a party to any agency 
proceeding or by a person adversely affected by agency action, and 
a showing that there has been undue delay in connection with such 
proceeding or action, the court may direct the agency to decide the 
matter promptly. In any such case the agency may show that the 
delay was necessary and unavoidable.45 
Although the legislative history appears to be silent as to why this 
alternative was rejected, deficiencies in the text itself provide a suffi-
cient answer. There is a substantial risk that the statute could be read 
narrowly to limit judicial relief solely to "directing the agency to 
decide the matter promptly." Such a limitation would have hampered 
reasonable judicial experimentation with alternative remedies. More-
over, the affirmative defense granted to the agency-that the delay 
was "necessary and unavoidable" -might have been construed to 
preclude other equally valid defenses, such as an assertion that the 
delay was caused by the party before the agency. 
Apart from the Senate bill's textual inadequacies, Congress may 
have had a more significant reason for rejecting the alternative con-
struction: a desire to frame a broad statutory standard which would 
allow the courts to fill the interstices. If this was the intent of Con-
gress, courts might begin to play a more active and creative role in 
granting relief from protracted administrative delay under the new 
APA. 
3. Abridgement of Review 
It may be argued that administrative delay also abridges the 
right of appeal or the statutory right to judicial review. In Latvian 
44. 5 u.s.c. § 706(1). 
45. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1966). 
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State Cargo b Passenger Steamship Line v. United States,46 the plain-
tiff sued to recover compensation for the taking of a ship which had 
been requisitioned nearly eight years earlier. During this period the 
Maritime Commission had failed to make any award or to take any 
action whatsoever. The Court of Claims reasoned that the mvner of 
requisitioned property has a right to appeal to a court after an 
administrative determination of the issue of just compensation. This 
right, the court maintained, could not be taken away by refusal of 
the agency to act or by its unreasonable delay in acting. 
This theory of abridgement of review seems to be more ·than a 
circuitous assertion that administrative delay is reviewable: in effect 
it assumes a right to prompt judicial review instead of a right to 
speedy administrative action. Moreover, this theory seems to prove 
too much. To be sure, protracted delay may postpone judicial re-
view on the merits. But other administrative activity may also pre-
clude judicial review. Informal settlements generally are not subject 
to judicial scrutiny; to argue that informal settlements should be 
subject to judicial review because they preclude judicial review 
would be absurd. Admittedly the abridgement of review theory has 
more plausibility in the context of administrative delay than it does 
when applied to informal settlements, partially because informal 
settlements are consensual and thus may give rise to a presumption 
that the parties agreed to forgo judicial review. Yet the abridgement 
theory on its face does not purport to distinguish between consensual 
and nonconsensual administrative activity, and absent such subtle 
distinctions, it seems that the theory does prove too much. 
4. Divestment of Agency Jurisdiction 
Another theory of relief, which is based on the proposition that an 
agency may divest itself of jurisdiction through unreasonable delay, 
seems to have more merit than the abridgement theory, at least when 
applied to an agency's prosecutorial functions.47 If the agency pro-
ceeds against a party within the time prescribed by the applicable 
statute of limitations and then acts at an unreasonbly leisurely pace, 
it may be contended that a court should treat the case as one in which 
the agency never instituted proceedings at all.48 However, the divest-
46. 88 F. Supp. 290 (Ct. Cl. 1950). 
47. For an example of an unsuccessful attempt to use the divestment theory, see 
Louisville &: Nashville R.R. v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel &: Iron Co., 269 U.S. 217 (1925). 
48. When there is no applicable statute of limitations, the divestment of jurisdic• 
tion theory may become a variant of the doctrine of !aches. 
1444 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66:1423 
ment of jurisdiction theory should not be applied mechanically to 
preclude desirable administrative action. Although a party has an 
interest in speedy adjudication, countervailing considerations49 may 
justify retention of jurisdiction by the agency in spite of the delay. 
But the logic of the divestment of jurisdiction theory compels out-
right dismissal rather than judicial acceleration of the administra-
tive proceeding or some lesser remedy; hence, its utility is limited 
whenever there are countervailing factors that would justify a less 
harsh remedy. 
5. Laches 
The use of the defense of !aches, based upon an agency's delay in 
instituting suit, would be precluded in the majority of states and in 
the federal courts by the rule that !aches is inapplicable to a suit by 
government to enforce a public right.50 An example of the minority 
rule allowing !aches to be asserted in this situation is Schireson v. 
Shafer,51 in which Schireson received a citation in 1944 to appear be-
fore the state licensing board to answer charges that he obtained his 
medical license by fraud in 1910. He sued to enjoin the board from 
holding the hearing, alleging, inter alia, that !aches precluded revoca-
tion of the license. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the 
!aches issue could not be resolved until after a hearing on the merits 
to determine if Dr. Schireson had been prejudiced by the delay. 
IV. OTHER POTENTIAL OBSTACLES TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Once the potential litigant establishes that the particular delay 
issue is justiciable and adopts one or more of the above theories of 
relief, he may have to face the doctrines of exhaustion, ripeness, 
and finality. Judicial review of administrative delay does not in-
variably involve these problems. For example, if judicial relief is 
sought to compel an agency to assume initial jurisdiction or to set 
aside or modify a final order because of protracted delay, these doc-
trines are inapplicable. But when suit is brought to secure relief from 
delay during the course of the administrative process, the doctrines 
of exhaustion, ripeness, and finality may come into play. These over-
lapping concepts, unlike justiciability, deal with an issue of tim-
49. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra. 
50. See, e.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); United States v. Penn-
salt Chems. Corp., 262 F. Supp. 101 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Sears v. Treasurer &: Receiver 
Gen., 327 Mass. 310, 98 N.E.2d 621 (1951). 
51. 354 Pa. 458, 47 A.2d 665 (1946). 
May 1968] Administrative Delay 1445 
ing-whether the party has come to court prematurely-and not 
with the ultimate question of whether the substantive issue is ap-
propriate for judicial decision at all. 
A. Exhaustion 
Normally, judicial relief is unavailable until the appropriate ad-
ministrative remedies have been exhausted. A variety of policy rea-
sons have been advanced in support of this rule. Primary among 
them is the consideration of economy, since inconvenience and delay 
normally result when agency proceedings are disrupted. In addition, 
judicial intervention may alter the proper relationship of the courts 
to the administrative process, negate the value of informed agency 
discretion, and overburden the courts. But these considerations have 
little force when, by hypothesis, the administrative process has be-
come inert: rather than creating inconvenience or delay, court in-
tervention seeks to remedy agency inaction. It may be true that an 
agency is better equipped than a court to determine the appropriate 
priority of its cases or the reasonable pace of its action, and that 
such discretion is essential to give necessary flexibility to the agency 
in dealing with a crowded docket; but, once a court has determined 
that the particular delay issue is justiciable, these considerations 
should be relevant only to the scope of review, and not to its avail-
ability. 52 Finally, the possibility of overburdening the courts53-if 
it is not exaggerated-may be a price which must be paid for neces-
sary policing of the administrative process. The floodgates may be 
partially closed by creating a strong presumption in favor of the 
agency in order to discourage frivolous suits.54 
Even if there are some residual policy reasons for applying the 
exhaustion rule in the context of administrative delay, it has never 
been contended that exhaustion is an essential prerequisite to judicial 
review.515 The policies which favor requiring exhaustion must be 
balanced against the injury to the party which would result from 
denial of relief. If the potential litigant would suffer irreparable in-
jury, there may be no need to exhaust administrative remedies. 56 
52. See Recent Case, Administrative Law-Right to Expeditious Hearing-District 
Court May Enjoin Implementation of NLRB Remand Order Where Unreasonable 
Delay Would Result, 76 HARv. L. R.Ev. 401, 404 (1962). 
53. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF .ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 424-26 (1965). 
54. See Recent Case, supra note 44, at 404 (1962). 
55. See K. DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 370-71 (1959). 
56. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942); 
Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 
(1954); Atlantic Seaboard Corp. v. FPC, 201 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1953). 
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Moreover, there is a well-defined exception to the exhaustion rule if 
the administrative remedy is inadequate or unavailable. 57 Conse-
quently, when the administrative process is in a state of suspended 
animation, and the agency provides no mechanism for reviewing its 
own delay, the exhaustion rule seems inapplicable. 
B. Ripeness 
While the exhaustion rule guards against unnecessary or inappro-
priate short-circuiting of the administrative process, the ripeness doc-
trine is concerned with whether the issue before the court has ma-
tured sufficiently to be a "controversy." The crucial considerations 
in deciding whether an issue is ripe for adjudication are the clarity 
of the issues to be determined and the hardship of denying relief to 
the party before the agency.58 Protracted administrative delay, like 
reapportionment, is an issue which does not seem to become more 
concrete with the passage of time. Thus, once a court decides that 
the particular delay issue is justiciable, the ripeness doctrine should 
be inapplicable. Although it is possible that parties will seek ju-
dicial relief before the delay has become unreasonable, in these cir-
cumstances the court should dismiss the case on the merits, rather 
than for lack of ripeness. And if the party before the agency has 
been harmed irreparably by protracted delay, this injury may ipso 
facto imply reviewability.59 Therefore, the ripeness doctrine does not 
seem to be a barrier to judicial review of administrative delay. 
C. Finality 
The rule that only final orders are subject to judicial review is 
based upon considerations of administrative and judicial economy. 
57. Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961); Sunshine Pub-
lishing Co. v. Summerfield, 184 F. Supp. 767 (D.D.C. 1960); Southeastern Oil Florida, 
Inc., 115 F. Supp. 198 (Ct. Cl. 1953); Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. United 
States, 88 F. Supp. 290 (Ct. Cl. 1950). See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF .AD-
MINISTRATIVE ACTION 424-26 (1965); 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.07 
(1958); Davis, Administrative Remedies Often Need Not Be Exhausted, 19 F.R.D. 437, 
476 (1956). 
58. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967) (footnote omitted): 
Without undertaking to survey the intricacies of the ripeness doctrine it is fair 
to say that its basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance or pre• 
mature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over 
administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference 
until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a con-
crete way by the challenging parties. The problem is best seen in a twofold aspect, 
requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the 
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. 
See also Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet 
Goods Ass'n, Inc., 387 U.S. 167 (1967). 
59. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942). 
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Review of intermediate orders interrupts and prolongs the admini-
strative process while affording parties an opportunity for constant 
delays. Moreover, an intermediate order may become moot if the 
party who was prejudiced by it obtains a favorable final decision. In 
such circumstances interim judicial review would be unnecessary. 
Neither of the policy reasons underlying the finality rule appears 
to be applicable in the case of protracted delay. When the admini-
strative process is at a standstill, judicial review will not interrupt 
agency proceedings. 6° Furthermore, since delay may be prejudicial 
despite the ultimate outcome on the merits, there is less likelihood 
that interim judicial relief will prove to have been unnecessary. 
This conclusion is supported by Deering Milliken, Inc. v. John-
ston, 61 in which the Fourth Circuit found that unreasonable delay by 
its very nature constitutes "final agency action" within the meaning 
of the AP A: 62 
Delay, so long as it continues and so long as there is any vestige of 
a right which will suffer further impairment by an extension of the 
delay, may not be final in the usual sense of that word, but when it 
amounts to a violation of § 6(a) [reasonable dispatch] ... and to a 
legal wrong within § IO(a) of that Act, it is final within the meaning 
of§ IO(c).63 
Such a construction clearly seems to implement the legislative man-
date of section IO(e)(A), which authorizes the reviewing court to 
"compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably de-
layed." And, because the reasons for the final order rule do not 
seem to apply when the issue before the court is protracted admini-
strative delay, it appears that the doctrine of finality, like ripeness 
and exhaustion, should not be a bar to judicial relief. 
V. THE DELAY ISSUE ON THE MERITS: A SUGGESTED .APPROACH 
After the party has surmounted the foregoing obstacles to court 
review and has set forth a tenable theory of relief, he must prove the 
issue of delay on the merits. Since the delay problem might arise in 
an indefinite number of factual settings, the following analysis is 
suggestive rather than exhaustive. In any case in which the delay 
issue is presented, a court must ask at least three question: Is there 
60. Although party exploitation of interim review as a dilatory tactic is unlikely 
where agency delay is the issue for review, interim review might divert some agency 
resources, thereby creating increased delay. 
61. 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961). 
62. See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text. 
63. 295 F .2d at 865. 
1448 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66:142ll 
delay at all? Is the delay unreasonable? And, even if the delay is 
unreasonable, are there countervailing policies which preclude re-
lief? Each of these questions will be examined in turn. 
A. Is There Delay at All? 
There are no absolute standards for distinguishing agency delay 
from the normal or necessary passage of time. Nevertheless, certain 
factors seem relevant to the determination of whether a particular 
party has suffered from agency delay. The progress of the proceeding 
may be compared to the rate experienced in cases of the same kind;64 
it would be a prima fade indication of delay if more time has elapsed 
than the normal time necessary to dispose of similar proceedings. In 
addition, the existence of unnecessary administrative activity or 
other dilatory behavior or attitudes may be indicative of protracted 
delay. 
If the party before the agency comes to court prematurely, judi-
cial relief will be unavailable, since, by hypothesis, there will have 
been no unreasonable delay. However, the same party can return to 
court later with identical contentions and the court will be forced to 
make a de nova determination of the delay issue, since the principle 
of res judicata will not serve as a bar to the action. This result is ex-
tremely desirable to the party before the agency. However, the result 
is unfortunate from the standpoint of administrative and judicial 
economy. The agency and the court must expend valuable resources 
in defending and disposing of repetitious suits. In addition, the po-
tential for harassment inherent in this situation might lead an agency 
to favor the more litigious party in its scheduling. Nevertheless, a 
party before the agency should not be limited to a single try in court. 
A good faith mistake ought not to preclude judicial relief perma-
nently. Instead, something more than mere delay ought to be re-
quired in the second suit; perhaps the court might require a showing 
that both suits were instituted in "good faith." However, since sub-
jective intent is difficult to ascertain, it might be preferable to re-
quire that a second suit could be instituted only after waiting a 
"reasonable" period of time. Neither the good faith nor the reason-
able time requirement would foreclose completely the possibility of 
wasted administrative and judicial resources or harassing multiple 
suits. Nevertheless, these two requirements together would probably 
64. See FTC v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 336 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1964) (court unable to 
find unreasonable delay where corporation failed to show time necessary to dispose of 
similar agency proceedings or evidence of a dilatory attitude by the agency). 
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eliminate many potential abuses. The courts' ability to control abuse 
of the review opportunity could be further strengthened by expressly 
granting courts the power to assess attorneys' fees against a party 
committing such abuse. 
B. Is the Delay Unreasonable? 
The determination of whether the passage of time is "unreason-
able" requires balancing at least two factors: the administrative justi-
fication for the delay and the harm to the party resulting from the 
delay. I£ the harm to the party is substantial and the justification for 
delay is weak, even a short delay might be intolerable. If the harm 
to the party is de minimus and the justification for delay is strong, 
even a substantial lapse of time might be permissible. If the harm to 
the party and the administrative justification are both substantial, 
or both minimal, then other policies may have to be considered to 
make a rational determination of whether the delay is "unreason-
able." 
1. Cause of Delay: Administrative Justification 
Time passes for many reasons, and a given instance of adminis-
trative delay may or may not be defensible. Some causes of delay 
are inherently unjustifiable, such as discrimination or bias. Other 
causes bear no reasonable relation to the effective functioning of the 
administrative process, such as unnecessary or repetitive proceedings. 
Still, administrative delay may be reasonable, as when its source lies 
in the complexity of the issues to be resolved or in the time-consum-
ing nature of the remedy. The court's function is to assess the admin-
istrative justification for the passage of time as it relates to the rea-
sonable needs of the agency. The court may also ask whether the 
cause of the delay, even if unjustified, can be alleviated by judicial 
relief. Other institutions may be better equipped to provide a rem-
edy-as, for example, when delay is caused by crowded dockets or 
inadequate legislative appropriations. 
A special problem arises when delay is caused in whole or in part 
by the dilatory tactics of the party before the agency. In such cir-
cumstances, it can be argued that the party comes to court with "un-
clean hands" and should not be eligible for judicial relief. However, 
the "unclean hands" notion should not foreclose relief in all circum-
stances. A court should evaluate how substantially the party has 
contributed to the delay; if the party's degree of fault is insignificant 
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and the agency's contribution to delay is considerable, then judicial 
relief should not be precluded. Undoubtedly, there are many prob-
lems of proof when inquiry is directed to the question of which liti-
gant has caused the delay. The court might require the party to prove 
that his activity or behavior did not contribute substantially to the 
delay. Alternatively, the agency could be allowed to assert party delay 
as an affirmative defense. Since proof of party delay differs from proof 
of agency delay in the respect that the necessary facts are not pecu-
liarly within the knowledge of one litigant, considerations of fairness 
and convenience do not compel either alternative. Therefore, the 
burden of proof should be allocated to the party or to the agency on 
the basis of an initial policy decision as to how easy it should be to 
get relief from agency delay. 
Irrespective of the cause of delay and of the related problems of 
proof, judicial relief might be foreclosed if the party before the 
agency waives his objection to the delay.65 Yet the waiver notion has 
its limits. A waiver should not readily be implied from party inaction, 
since parties often will not know that the agency is taking an inordi-
nately long time. Moreover, frequent application of the waiver doc-
trine would encourage unnecessary, repetitive, and time-consuming 
party activity designed to negate the possibility of waiver. Finally, 
in instances of gross agency delay other policies might justify judicial 
intervention despite an express waiver. 
2. Harm to the Party 
In addition to assessing the administrative justification for delay, 
a court must assay the nature and magnitude of the harm that the 
delay has inflicted upon the party before the agency. In making such 
an appraisal, the initial question is whether "irreparable harm" is a 
necessary prerequisite to invoking judicial relief. 
Despite traditional theory, a showing of something less than irrep-
arable harm may constitute adequate grounds for judicial relief in 
situations where there is no administrative justification for delay, or 
where a court perceives a need to police the administrative process. If, 
.£or example, delay results from unnecessary or repetitive proceed-
ings, a court may relax the irrreparable harm standard. Not only is 
such wasted administrative action unjustified, but also the strong 
independent policy of optimum allocation of administrative re-
65. There appear to be no cases on waiver of a delay objection; however, American 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 191 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1951), seems to imply that tbe waiver 
notion is applicable. 
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sources argues in favor of intervention. Likewise, pecuniary harm-
whether irreparable or not-seems irrelevant when delay results from 
discrimination or bias. In such situations, complementary policies of 
equal protection and impartiality compel judicial intervention. 
In those instances, however, where there are either some adminis-
trative justifications for delay or no other policies independently 
favoring judical relief, a showing of irreparable injury should be 
necessary. And, if adequate and nonburdensome alternative remedies 
can serve to insulate the party from the harmful effects of the delay, 
judicial relief should not be available. In the case of a rate-making 
proceeding, for example, judicial relief from delay should be pre-
cluded if the applicant desiring higher rates were given the alterna-
tive of increasing its rate structure while placing the extra funds in 
escrow pending the outcome of the rate-making proceeding. But, as 
the burden of recovering losses from administrative delay increases, a 
court is faced with the necessity of deciding at what point the harm 
becomes irreparable. For example, is the harm irreparable when de-
lay results in higher construction costs for a new facility? Although 
these costs eventually can be recovered through increased rates, re-
covery will be achieved over a long period of time and at an added 
cost to consumers. 
Whether or not irreparable harm is always a required condition 
for court intervention, it is not necessarily a sufficient ground for 
judicial relief. This principle is illustrated in cases like hypothetical 
case I, where the most appropriate judical remedy would be accelera-
tion of the agency proceedings. Assuming a limited supply of adminis-
trative resources, acceleration might require the agency to alter its 
priority of cases. In this situation, a showing of irreparable harm may 
not be enough; the court might also require proof that the altered 
agency calendar would not impose an undue burden on other parties 
before the agency. Developing this kind of proof may be both time-
consuming and difficult, and would involve the court in the judi-
cially unmanageable task of balancing largely immeasurable factors. 
When these problems appear, the court might instead require the 
party seeking judicial relief to show that the harm it has suffered 
quantitatively outweighs the harm which judicial relief would cause 
to other parties before the agency. This objective test would simplify 
the judicial inquiry substantially. Yet, quite apart from the problem 
of how the court could evolve a meaningful standard to decide what 
the threshold level of harm ought to be, a rigid application of such a 
"quantitative substantiality" test might limit judicial relief from 
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administrative delay to larger applicants, since smaller parties would 
be less easily able to make the required threshold showing of harm. 
Nevertheless, there will still be instances in which the burden to 
other parties before the agency will be immeasurable. In those cases 
courts may be compelled to make an essentially arbitrary, intuitive 
judgment about comparative harm. 
C. Competing Policies 
Even if a party shows the requisite harm to himself, absence of 
potential harm to other parties, and a lack of administrative justifi-
cation for delay, other competing policies may still prohibit judicial 
relief. These countervailing considerations frequently arise in suits 
to review or enforce NLRB back pay orders66 when employers con-
tend that agency delay in issuing the order substantially increased 
their liability and prevented them from mitigating damages. Em-
ployers have been unsuccessful in this contention, despite a showing 
of the requisite irreparable harm and lack of administrative justifica-
tion for the delay. Although the employer has an interest in a rapid 
determination of his liability, this interest can be vindicated only at 
the expense of imposing the burden of delay upon the workers 
against whom the employer discriminated. Even the entire back pay 
award is a wholly unsatisfactory remedy to these people; to reduce 
this award still further because of administrative delay would be 
harsh and unfair. 
Other policies, aside from the equities asserted by other interested 
parties, may preclude judicial relief. In cases where an agency brings 
suit to obtain enforcement of a binding order, for example, 67 the 
lapse of time between the agency's issuance of the order and initia-
tion of the court action should not be grounds either for denying 
enforcement or for granting the defendant leave to adduce additional 
evidence of interim compliance. Granting relief for delay in this 
situation would encourage deliberate violation of administrative 
regulations and subvert the policy favoring promptness in seeking 
court review. 
Thus, although the party before the agency may have an interest 
66. See, e.g., NLRB v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 315 U.S. 685 (1942); NLRB v. 
Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1965); NLRB v. American Creosoting Co., 
139 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1943); NLRB v. Grower-Shipper Vegetable Ass'n of Central 
Calif., 122 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1941); NLRB v. Wilson Line, Inc., 122 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 
1941). 
67. See NLRB v. Pool Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. 577 (1950); NLRB v. Crompton-Highland 
Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949); NLRB v. Eanet, 179 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1949); NLRB v. 
Aluminum Prods. Co., 120 F.2d 567,573 (7th Cir. 1941). 
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in the rapid determination of his rights or liabilities, this interest 
may be subordinated to other interests or policies in appropriate cir-
cumstances. And conversely, if the party before the agency establishes 
the requisite harm from unjustified administrative delay, then, in 
the absence of other overriding interests or policies, the party seems 
entitled to a judicial remedy. 
VI. REMEDIES 
There are many remedies to combat protracted administrative 
delay in the judicial arsenal. When the suit is brought before agency 
action is initiated, the remedy may be an order compelling the agency 
to assume jurisdiction68 over the case or to refuse jurisdiction.69 If 
suit is instituted after agency action is complete, the appropriate re-
lief may take the form of an order to set aside70 or modify71 the orig-
inal order, or to suspend,72 equalize,73 or deny74 enforcement of that 
order. And when suit is instituted prior to the completion of the 
administrative process, there are at least three remedies available. 
The first of these is judicial acceleration, which can be achieved by 
enjoining agency activity that is purposeless, unduly oppressive, or 
repetitive,75 by a remand to the agency with directions to proceed 
with all deliberate speed,76 or by mandamus requiring the agency to 
approve party action or show cause why no approval should be forth-
coming.77 A second possibility is judicial pre-emption of the power 
to decide the substantive issues.78 This remedy, since it precludes the 
agency from making the initial determination pursuant to its statu-
tory mandate, should be employed sparingly, if at all. 
The third means of disposition is judicial termination of agency 
proceedings. In United States v. One Book Entitled "The Adventures 
of Father Silas/'79 for example, protracted delay between the time 
68. Order of Railway Conductors of America v. Swan, 329 U.S. 520 (1947). 
69. Schireson v. Shafer, 354 Pa. 458, 47 A.2d 665 (1946). 
70. NLRB v. American Creosoting Co., 139 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1943). 
71. NLRB v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 315 U.S. 685 (1942). 
72. C. E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1957), rev'd sub nom. Moog 
Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958). 
73. Atlantic Seaboard Corp. v. FPC, 201 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1953). 
74. NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1965). 
75. Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961). 
76. American Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 191 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
77. Application of Trico Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 92 Ariz. 373, 377 P.2d 309 (1962). 
78. See, e.g., Sunshine Publishing Co. v. Summerfield, 184 F. Supp. 767 (D.C. Cir. 
1960) (agency delayed in processing an application for second-class mailing privileges; 
court ordered the application granted); Southeastern Oil Florida v. United States, 115 
F. Supp. 198 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (agency delayed in processing a claim for payment; court 
decided that plaintiff was entitled to recover). 
79. 249 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
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that allegedly obscene books were seized by the Collector of Customs 
and the time that an action to confiscate the books was instituted 
served as grounds for invalidating the seizure. The remedy granted 
for this unlawful delay was release of the books, whether or not ob-
scene, to the claimant. This kind of remedy will effectively deter 
administrative laxity and does not appear overly harsh, particularly 
when the delay impinges upon the constitutionally protected interest 
in a rapid determination of the obscenity issue. Moreover, the public 
interest in preventing obscene literature from circulating ·will not 
be seriously jeopardized by the isolated use of such a remedy because 
of the minimal number of books which will be released. On the other 
hand, dismissal in disciplinary cases seems inappropriate when the 
party's interest in speedy adjudication is clearly subordinate to the 
public interest in effectuating administrative policy. so Moreover, 
it is arguable that the agency, rather than the court, is a more appro-
priate body to decide whether dismissal would endanger the adminis-
trative regulatory scheme and be contrary to the public interest. 
A somewhat related problem is whether a party to an adminis-
trative proceeding is entitled to a dismissal with prejudice. The 
limitations upon the power of an agency to terminate proceedings 
arbitrarily without disposing of the case were involved in Min-
neapolis Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission,81 where the court 
refused to let the agency terminate a rate proceeding prior to reach-
ing a final decision. Despite the fact that the agency had complete 
discretion in instituting such proceedings, the court concluded that 
the party before the agency could-after completing lengthy and 
costly hearings which were arbitrarily discontinued without reach-
ing a final decision-go to court to compel the agency to enter a final 
decision. 
In choosing between judicial acceleration, judicial pre-emption, 
or judicial termination, a court should select that form of relief which 
has the least adverse effect on the proper functioning of the adminis-
trative process. In most cases, this consideration would indicate the 
choice of judicial acceleration. But if the only appropriate remedy 
will have some undesirable affect on the administrative process, then 
this effect must be balanced together with the harm to the party and 
the administrative justification for the delay in deciding whether 
relief should be granted at all. If there is no appropriate remedy, it 
may be that we have come full circle-that is, it may be that the 
particular delay issue is not justiciable in the first place. 
80. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 381 U.S. 739 (1965). 
81. 294 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1961). 
